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I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 21, 2005, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that
county child protection workers may be liable at common law for
negligent investigations under the Child Abuse Reporting Act
1
(CARA). In so doing, the court waded once again into a thicket of
†
1.

Adjunct professors, William Mitchell College of Law.
Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 799 (Minn. 2005).
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legal doctrines used to determine when Minnesota law provides a
cause of action against government actors who are negligent in the
performance of their duties.
Much of the confusion in this area flows from cases
discussing—and sometimes conflating—two separate legal
doctrines: (1) the so-called “public duty” rule governing common law
negligence actions arising from an official’s performance of
2
statutory duties, and (2) the distinct analysis used to divine
whether the legislature has implicitly provided for a statutory cause
of action in such cases. In Radke v. County of Freeborn, the court
restored some clarity to this area by overruling its earlier decision
3
in Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, a case which seemed to merge these
two analyses. In Radke, the court confirmed that the public duty
rule can give rise to common law tort liability based upon child
protection workers’ duties to a victim under CARA, separate and
apart from the question of whether the legislature implicitly
4
provided for such a cause of action in the statute itself. However,
the court passed up the opportunity to clarify the status of other
precedents, leaving some questions in this area still unanswered.
Part II of this Article traces the separate development of the
common law public duty rule and the implied statutory cause of
action analysis. Part III examines the Hoppe case, where the
supreme court seemed to hold that the absence of an implied
statutory cause of action precluded the existence of a common law
cause of action. Part IV then assesses the Radke court’s effort to
resolve the confusion flowing from Hoppe.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
This section discusses the key cases underlying the two distinct
doctrines relating to whether a cause of action exists for negligence
by government actors: the common law public duty rule and the
implied statutory cause of action analysis.

2. “[T]he ‘public duty rule’ requires that a governmental unit owe the
plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the general public in order for the
governmental unit to be found liable. In other words, a purely ‘public duty’—as
opposed to a ‘special duty’—cannot give rise to government tort liability.” Id. at
793 (citations omitted).
3. 543 N.W.2d 635 (Minn. 1996).
4. 694 N.W.2d at 798-99.
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A. The Common Law Public Duty Rule
It is settled law that a person has no duty to prevent a third
party from physically harming a victim unless either (1) the person
and the third party have a special relationship that imposes a duty
upon the person to control the third party’s conduct, or (2) the
person has a special relationship with the victim that gives the
5
injured party a right to protection. Three cases illustrate how this
principle has developed under Minnesota law where the alleged
tortfeasor is a government actor.
1.

Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle

In Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, a landowner sued a
township and a county for damages to his property resulting from a
6
fire that started in the township’s dump. Lorshbough brought a
common law negligence action, relying on solid waste management
7
laws to establish the township’s duty of care. The Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must either show that the
township or county owed him a duty that it did not owe the general
8
public, or that the plaintiff “distinguished himself from other
members of the public” through “some sort of contact between the
governmental unit and the plaintiff” that induced detrimental
9
reliance by the plaintiff.
Because the county had “actual
knowledge of the risk of serious harm” and was “in a position and
had the authority to abate the risk,” the plaintiff was able to
establish that the county owed him a duty derived from statute that
10
was not owed to the general public.
2.

Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park

Seven years later, a divided Minnesota Supreme Court
provided further guidance for determining whether a duty owed
was “public” or “private.” The court held that even if a municipality
enacts a general ordinance or makes inspections, it has no
common law duty to prevent a third person from harming another
5. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315 (1965).
6. 258 N.W.2d 96, 97 (Minn. 1977).
7. Id. at 97-98.
8. Id. at 98-99 (citing Hoffert v. Owatonna Inn Towne Motel, Inc., 293 Minn.
220, 222, 199 N.W.2d 158, 160 (1972)).
9. Id. at 99.
10. Id. at 103.
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unless there is some sort of special duty arising from a special
11
relationship between the municipality and the third person. In
Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, two fathers sued the City of St. Louis
Park, alleging that a city inspector negligently failed to discover a
12
fire ordinance violation at a school. Two boys died and another
suffered severe burns when a fifty-five-gallon drum of highly
flammable duplicating fluid exploded on a loading dock near a
13
frequently used entrance.
The court explained that, regardless of whether the defendant
is a natural person or a municipality, a duty owed to the public in
14
general cannot form the basis of a negligence action.
It then
discussed four non-exclusive factors to be considered when
evaluating whether a municipality has voluntarily assumed a special
15
duty to protect others and not merely itself. The court stated that
two factors which tend to impose a duty of care are the
municipality’s actual knowledge of the dangerous condition and a
person’s reliance on the municipality’s representations and
16
conduct, neither of which were present on the facts of Cracraft.
The third factor identified by the court was the possibility that an
ordinance or statute may have created a duty of care by setting
forth “mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a particular class
17
of persons rather than the public as a whole.” On this factor, the
court refused to impose a duty of care merely because an
inspection was undertaken, stating that the codes, ordinances, and
statutes were not “drawn with sufficient specificity to create an
18
inspection duty in favor of a class of individuals.”
The fourth
factor considered was whether the municipality used due care to
19
avoid increasing the risk of harm.
The court found that the
defendant-municipality in Cracraft did nothing to increase the risk
20
of harm.
Based on its analysis of these factors, the court
concluded that the City of St. Louis Park owed only a general duty
to the public rather than a more specific duty to a special class of

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn. 1979).
Id. at 802-03.
Id.
Id. at 804.
Id. at 806-07.
Id.
Id. at 807.
Id. at 807-08.
Id.
Id.
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individuals, and as a result no cause of action could be maintained
21
at common law.
3.

Andrade v. Ellefson

In 1986, the Minnesota Supreme Court, with three justices
concurring specially, applied the four Cracraft factors to find that
Anoka County owed children and their parents a special duty
different from the duty owed to the general public when it
22
inspected and licensed daycare facilities. In Andrade v. Ellefson,
two fathers sued an in-home day care operator and Anoka County
23
for injuries their children sustained while at the day care center.
The plaintiffs alleged that they had a special relationship with
Anoka County and that the county was therefore required to
exercise due care when inspecting and supervising day care centers
24
it licensed.
The court first found that Anoka County had waived immunity
to the extent that it purchased liability insurance, and then turned
25
to the special duty issue.
After noting the general rule that a
person has no common law duty to prevent a third person from
injuring another absent a special relationship, the court explained
that not all four Cracraft factors need be satisfied to find a cause of
26
action, especially where one factor predominates. The court also
27
reiterated that other, unarticulated factors may be relevant. The
court then relied on the third Cracraft factor—the existence of a
statute requiring “mandatory acts clearly for the protection of a
28
particular class of persons rather than the public as a whole” —to
29
find that the Public Welfare Licensing Act mandated that small
children in a licensed day care facility be considered a particular
protected class because of their unique vulnerability and because
the statute’s focus on children demonstrated a clear intent to

21. Id. at 808.
22. Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 840-43 (Minn. 1986).
23. Id. at 837.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 840-42.
26. Id. at 841.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 807.
29. MINN. STAT. §§ 245.781-.812 (1984) (repealed 1987); see MINN. STAT.
§ 252.28, subd. 2 (2004). See generally MINN. STAT. §§ 245A.01-.65 (incorporating
many provisions of the Public Welfare Licensing Act in the Human Services
Licensing Act).
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benefit these children specifically rather than the public
30
The court held that the Act created a duty of care
generally.
because the Act set forth mandatory acts for the protection of a
31
particular class of persons.
These cases thus established the contours of the common law
public duty analysis: Lorshbough demonstrated that the special
relationship exception to general tort principles regarding duty of
care could be applied to government actors, Cracraft introduced
four factors to guide courts when dealing with such claims, and
32
Andrade explained how those factors should be applied.
B. Implied Statutory Causes of Action
Up to this point, the discussion has focused on the common
law’s recognition of causes of action derived from statutory duties.
But, in addition to judge-made common law causes of action, new
causes of action may also be created by the legislature. When the
legislature is explicit about its intent to create a new cause of
action, courts ordinarily do not hesitate to apply the new cause of
33
action, even alongside traditional common law causes of action.
30. Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 842.
31. Id. Justices Wahl and Yetka concurred specially, due to their belief that
two other Cracraft factors (actual knowledge and reasonable reliance) had been
satisfied. Id. at 843-44. Justice Scott concurred in the result, arguing that in these
cases, the court should not analyze whether a county owes a special duty to the
plaintiff, but rather the court should impose a duty of care on the county because
it undertook the inspection of the facility. Id. at 845-46.
32. The four-factor analysis articulated in Cracraft for determining whether a
governmental entity owes the plaintiff a special duty, different from the duty owed
the general public, now appears to be settled law. See, e.g., Radke v. County of
Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 796-98 (Minn. 2005); Andrade, 391 N.W.2d at 841-43.
However, it is important to note that the holding in Cracraft was not unanimous.
Three justices, including Justice Scott, dissented in Cracraft, arguing that the
majority’s approach departed from the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Cracraft v.
City of St. Paul, 279 N.W.2d 801, 808-13 (Minn. 1979). Two years later in Hage v.
Stade, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on Cracraft when holding that a cause
of action could not be brought against the State for an allegedly negligent fire
inspection. 304 N.W.2d 283, 285-88 (Minn. 1981). This time, three justices joined
Justice Scott in his detailed dissent, which discussed how Cracraft departed from
the common law. Id. at 291-96. Justice Scott also noted that Cracraft conflicted
with Lorshbaugh, which allowed constructive knowledge of a dangerous condition
to create a duty; Cracraft limited its first factor to actual knowledge of a dangerous
conditions. Id. at 294 n.8. In addition, Justice Scott argued that the artificial
distinction between a public duty and a private duty essentially grants sovereign
immunity where the legislature has not spoken. Id. at 289.
33. For example, the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act (MERA) created a
cause of action allowing any person to bring a civil action for protection of natural
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Problems arise, however, when the legislature is unclear about its
intention to create—or withhold—a cause of action to enforce
statutory rights. In those situations, Minnesota’s appellate courts
have taken markedly different approaches to determining whether
an implied statutory cause of action can be found.
1. The Minnesota Court of Appeals’ Approach
In the Minnesota Court of Appeals, this issue is usually
addressed under the framework established in Counties of Blue Earth
34
v. Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry and Flour Exchange
35
That analysis follows the U.S. Supreme
Building Corp. v. State.
36
Court’s analysis of this issue in Cort v. Ash and requires the
examination of three factors:
(1) whether the plaintiff belongs to the class for whose
benefit the statute was enacted;
(2) whether the legislature indicated an intent to create
or deny a remedy; and
(3) whether implying a remedy would be consistent with
37
the underlying purposes of the legislative enactment.
The court of appeals has applied this analysis to a range of statutes
but has yet to find an implied statutory cause of action under this
38
approach.

resources located in Minnesota against “pollution, impairment, or destruction.”
MINN. STAT. § 116B.03 (2004). This express statutory cause of action has been
successfully used alongside traditional common law causes of action like trespass.
See, e.g., Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen’s Club, Inc., 624 N.W.2d
796 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming injunction against gun club based on MERA
as well as common law nuisance and trespass causes of action).
34. 489 N.W.2d 265 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
35. 524 N.W.2d 496 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
36. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). There is considerable doubt about whether the
Supreme Court continues to strictly adhere to this analysis. See Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 189 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It could not be plainer that
we effectively overruled the Cort v. Ash analysis . . . converting one of its four
factors (congressional intent) into the determinative factor, with the other three
merely indicative of its presence or absence.”) (citations omitted).
37. Flour Exch. Bldg., 524 N.W.2d at 499.
38. See, e.g., Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Midway Massage, Inc., 695 N.W.2d 138,
142 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005); Buck v. Freeeman, 619 N.W.2d 793, 797-98 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2000); Kuelbs v. Williams, 609 N.W.2d 10, 14-15 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000);
Eason v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 11, 598 N.W.2d 414, 417-18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
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2. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Approach
Although the Minnesota Supreme Court shares the Minnesota
Court of Appeals’ reluctance to find implicit statutory causes of
action, the precise contours of its analysis are less clear. In Bruegger
v. Faribault County Sheriff’s Department, the supreme court reaffirmed
that as a general matter, “[p]rinciples of judicial restraint”
precluded it from finding a statutory cause of action “where the
legislature has not either by the statute’s express terms or by
39
implication provided for civil tort liability.” However, the court
offered no analysis of how or when such an implication may arise,
and its discussion seemed to blur the distinction between implying
such a statutory cause of action and the common law public duty
40
rule.
In Bruegger, the parents of a minor who was a victim of sexual
abuse sued the Faribault County Sheriff’s Department because
officials did not inform them that they might be able to obtain
41
compensation under the Crime Victims Reparations Act (CVRA).
The statute required applications for compensation to be made
within one year of the injury unless the victim was “unable” to do
so; however, the statute further provided that lack of knowledge
about the statute—including the failure of law enforcement to
inform a claimant about the statute—would not excuse compliance
42
with the one-year filing deadline. The Brueggers did not learn
43
about their rights under CVRA until after one year had elapsed.
They then sued the sheriff’s department, alleging that the statute
created “an affirmative duty on the sheriff’s department to inform
them of the CVRA and that the department’s failure to inform the
44
family was a breach of this duty.”
The Brueggers argued that the case was controlled by the
45
supreme court’s holding in Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle. As
discussed above, the court held in Lorshbough that a statute
governing solid waste disposal established the standard of care for
the county’s management of a garbage dump, and that the county’s
breach of the duty—created by its actual knowledge of the risk of
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

497 N.W.2d 260, 262 (Minn. 1993).
Id.
Id. at 261.
MINN. STAT. § 611A.53, subd. 2(e) (1992).
Bruegger, 497 N.W.2d at 261.
Id.
Id.
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serious harm and by its opportunity to abate the risk, which led to a
46
The Bruegger court
forest fire—gave rise to liability in tort.
rejected the analogy to Lorshbough and purported to draw a
distinction between situations like Lorshbough, where a statutory
duty was the basis for a common law negligence action, and the
separate question of whether a statute implicitly creates a new cause
47
of action. The court noted that in Lorshbough, even in the absence
of a statute, “Beltrami County would still have been subject to suit
in common law negligence because of its failure to properly
maintain the dump,” presumably because that failure created a
48
The court contrasted this with the
common law nuisance.
situation in Bruegger, where, according to the court, “no common
law duty required the sheriff’s department to inform the Brueggers
49
of their potential rights of recovery under the CVRA.
The
requirement to inform did not arise until the enactment of the
50
CVRA.”
The implication, at least, was that the proper inquiry
under the facts was whether the legislature intended to impose civil
tort liability upon a law enforcement agency for failing to inform
crime victims of their rights under CVRA—that is, whether the
legislature implicitly meant to create a statutory cause of action.
But, in answering this question in the negative, the court did not
identify any specific factors to guide its analysis. Perhaps more
troubling is that the Brueggers’ claim was, according to the court, a
claim for “negligence,” a term which at least suggests the assertion
of a common law cause of action in the mold of Lorshbough and,
more importantly, Cracraft and its progeny. Yet the Bruegger court’s
assertion, without further analysis, that “no common law duty”
existed on the part of the sheriff’s department to inform the
Brueggers about the existence of the CVRA seemed to ignore
Cracraft, where the court created a multi-factor analysis, one part of
which serves to determine whether or not a statute gives rise to
51
such a common law duty.
46. Lorshbough v. Twp. of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96, 103 (Minn. 1977).
47. Bruegger, 497 N.W.2d at 261-62.
48. Id. at 262.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. This distinction between a common law cause of action based on a
statutory duty and a purely statutory cause of action is more than just a matter of
semantics. A common law negligence action based on a statutory duty remains a
common law cause of action, with all of its attendant common law elements and
common law defenses. In contrast, the elements of a statutory cause of action,
whether express or implied, flow from the statute and its interpretation and may
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The confusion reflected in Bruegger regarding the distinction
between the public duty rule and implied statutory causes of action
set the stage for the supreme court’s 1996 holding in Hoppe v.
Kandiyohi County that failure to comply with the Vulnerable Adults
52
Reporting Act (VARA) did not give rise to tort liability —a holding
53
subsequently reversed in Radke.
Because of the importance of
Hoppe to understanding the Radke decision, the next section of this
Article examines Hoppe in depth.
III. HOPPE V. KANDIYOHI COUNTY
A.

Statutory Background

The statute at issue in Hoppe was VARA, which in 1994
mandated that particular individuals were required to report
suspected neglect or abuse of vulnerable adults, and listed the
54
duties of the local welfare agency upon receipt of a report. At
that time, VARA provided that a person who failed to make a
required report was guilty of a misdemeanor and that a person who
negligently or intentionally failed to make a required report would
55
be liable for damages resulting from that failure.
The statute
stated that a person who made a voluntary or mandatory report or
participated in an investigation would be immune from any civil or
56
criminal liability if that person acted in good faith.
The statute also imposed obligations on certain governmental
actors to “immediately” take certain measures in response to

thus be significantly different from analogous common law causes of action. To
return to a prior example, a MERA cause of action has elements quite different
from a trespass cause of action, even though both may peacefully co-exist in the
same lawsuit. See, e.g., Citizens for a Safe Grant v. Lone Oak Sportsmen’s Club,
Inc., 624 N.W.2d 796, 804-06 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (identifying elements of
common law trespass and the distinct elements of a statutory MERA claim); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 14 cmt. b (2005) (“[L]arge numbers of statutes,
in declaring conduct unlawful and creating a public-law penalty, are silent as to
private liability in the event of a statutory violation. In a suit brought by the victim
of such a violation, the court, relying on ordinary principles of legislative
interpretation, may in appropriate cases infer from the statute a cause of action for
damages against the violator.”).
52. 543 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Minn. 1996).
53. See infra Part IV.
54. MINN. STAT. § 626.557, subds. 3, 10 (1994).
55. Id. subd. 7.
56. Id. subd. 5.
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57

reports of abuse. Subdivision 10 of the statute provided that upon
receipt of a report, the “local welfare agency shall immediately
investigate and offer emergency and continuing protective social
58
services.” Subdivision 11a similarly provided that “upon receipt”
of an abuse report from a social service agency, “the prosecuting
authority shall immediately investigate, prosecute when warranted,
59
and transmit its findings and disposition to the referring agency.”
These requirements to take “immediate” action—and the alleged
failure of officials in Kandiyohi County to do so—were at the center
of the Hoppe case.
B. The Facts and the Claims
The Hoppe case involved a claim of financial exploitation of an
older adult. Georgia Hoppe, who was more than ninety years old at
the time the case arose, had appointed Paul Bengston as her
60
attorney-in-fact to help her manage her financial affairs.
Bengston was an employee of Green Lake State Bank, where
61
Hoppe had an account.
From June 1989 to November 1990,
Bengston wrote numerous checks on Hoppe’s account, including
62
checks payable to Bengston. Bengston subsequently admitted to
63
forging Hoppe’s signature.
In March 1990, another bank employee, Allen Struck, spoke
64
with Hoppe about the activity on her account.
According to
65
Struck, Hoppe seemed to have complete trust in Bengston.
Struck then took his concerns to Sondra Anderson at Kandiyohi
County Family Services, who in turn contacted the Kandiyohi
Sheriff’s Department and the County Attorney and completed a
66
Vulnerable Adult Complaint.
At the County Attorney’s suggestion, it was decided that a
mental health worker would meet with Hoppe and evaluate
whether she understood what Bengston was doing with her
57. Id. subds. 4, 4a.
58. Id. subd. 10(a).
59. Id. subd. 11a.
60. Stipulation of Facts at 1-2, Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, No. C6-93-1215
(Dist. Ct. Kandiyohi County 1994).
61. Id. at 1.
62. Id. at 2.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 3-4.

06MAHONEY.DOC

1394

5/31/2006 1:12:03 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:4

67

money.
After the evaluation, either the county social services
workers or the County Attorney were to advise the sheriff’s office as
to whether further investigation by law enforcement was
68
warranted. Despite this plan, the county took no further action
69
for more than six months. In that time, nineteen checks payable
to Bengston and allegedly signed by Hoppe were drawn on
70
Hoppe’s account at Green Lake State Bank, for a total of $54,500.
On October 10, 1990, Struck contacted Anderson again and
told her that Bengston had taken substantial amounts of Hoppe’s
money, had cashed in some of her bonds, and was giving money to
71
his children and taking trips to Las Vegas. After relaying some of
this information to the sheriff’s department, Kandiyohi County
Family Services sent two employees to interview Hoppe on October
72
19, 1990. Hoppe appeared confused about dates and names and
73
about her financial situation. She also told the Family Services
workers that she was being abused by staff at the nursing home and
74
that she wished she would die.
The following day, one of the Family Services workers who
interviewed Hoppe met with the County Attorney, who agreed to
help the Family Services agency commence guardianship
75
proceedings.
About five weeks later, a Vulnerable Adult
Maltreatment Report was prepared by Family Services, and a special
76
That action
guardian was appointed on November 30, 1990.
77
terminated Bengston’s power-of-attorney.
In the meantime,
however, eight more checks payable to Bengston and totaling
$17,200 had been drawn on Hoppe’s account from October 22 to
78
November 28, 1990.

67. Id. at 4.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 4-5.
70. Id. at 5-8. The stipulation also notes the existence of two other checks
payable to Bengston, totaling $10,000, pre-dating the March 20, 1990 conference.
Id. at 3, 5.
71. Id. at 7-8.
72. Id. at 8-9.
73. Id. at 9-11.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 11.
76. Id. at 13.
77. Id. at 1.
78. Id. at 11-13.
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C. The Lawsuit and the District Court’s Decision
After settling a claim against the Green Lake State Bank for
negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, Hoppe sued Kandiyohi
County for failing to take immediate steps to protect Hoppe from
financial exploitation after the March 1990 report made by bank
employee Struck, and for subsequent delays in investigating the
79
case.
Hoppe and the county both moved for summary
80
judgment.
The district court modeled its analysis largely on the supreme
court’s discussion in Bruegger. The district court first noted that the
provisions of VARA requiring the County Attorney to immediately
investigate vulnerable adult abuse reports did not create a private
81
cause of action against the county. The court then cited Bruegger
as standing for the proposition that “[a] statute does not create a
private cause of action if, absent the statute, the county would not
82
be subject to suit in common law negligence.” The district court
thus appears to have read Bruegger as completely precluding the
83
Citing
possibility that a statute might imply a cause of action.
Lorshbough, the court stated that it would have reached a different
conclusion if the county had been “subject to suit in common law
negligence absent the statute,” but noted that no common law duty
existed requiring the County Attorney to immediately investigate
84
financial exploitation. The court therefore found that the county
85
was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
D.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals
86

Shortly after appealing the district court’s order, Hoppe died.
In the Statement of the Case to the court of appeals, Hoppe’s
personal representative and former guardian characterized her
79. Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, No. C6-93-1215, slip op. at 4 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Kandiyohi County 1994). The County, in turn, named the bank and Bengston as
third-party defendants. Id. Their role in the proceedings is not further discussed
here.
80. Id. at 1.
81. Id. at 4-5.
82. Id. at 5 (citing Bruegger v. Fairbault County Sheriff’s Dep’t, 497 N.W.2d
260, 262 (Minn. 1993)).
83. See id.
84. Id. (citing Lorshbough v. Twp. of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96 (Minn. 1977)).
85. Id. at 6.
86. Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, No. C0-94-1627, 1995 WL 70167, at *2
(Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1995).
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claim as a “negligence action . . . as a result of the County’s breach
87
of its duties under the Vulnerable Adults Act and at common law.”
Unlike the district court’s focus on the responsibilities of the
County Attorney under subdivision 11 of VARA, the court of
appeals focused on the obligations of the Kandiyohi County Family
88
Services agency under subdivision 10(c). The court noted that
the statute did not expressly make a county liable for failing to
carry out its duties to immediately investigate and offer protective
services, but ultimately found the case “similar” to Andrade v.
89
Ellefson. Writing on behalf of the court, Judge Amundson applied
the factors promulgated in Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park and
found that vulnerable adults were a “‘particular protected class’
90
and, like children, ‘uniquely vulnerable.’” Judge Amundson also
noted that the facts in Hoppe’s case were even more compelling
than in Andrade, as “the county had actual knowledge of the danger
91
to Hoppe.” Based on this analysis, the court found that a special
relationship existed between the county’s social service agency and
Hoppe, “giving rise to a tort duty of care owed by the county to
92
Hoppe.”
E.

The Supreme Court’s Decision

The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and
unanimously reversed the court of appeals, reinstating summary
93
judgment for the county. The court distinguished Andrade on the
basis that the statute at issue in Andrade had not discussed penalties
or liability, while the legislature had spoken to the question of
penalties imposed for failure to make a report under VARA, and
had not identified consequences for failure to investigate or

87. Appellant’s Statement of the Case at 1, Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, No.
C0-94-1627, 1995 WL 70167 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 1995).
88. Hoppe, 1995 WL 70167, at *4.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *5.
91. Id.
92. Id. In reaching this result, the court also distinguished one of its own
recent cases, Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). Hoppe,
1995 WL 70167, at *5. In Valtakis, the court had declined to find a private cause of
action under CARA—the statute that would eventually be at issue in Radke. 504
N.W.2d at 267. The court distinguished Valtakis on the grounds that the court
there “did not consider Cracraft or Andrade in reaching its decision.” Hoppe, 1995
WL 70167, at *5.
93. Hoppe v. Kandiyohi County, 543 N.W.2d 635, 636 (Minn. 1996).
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94

intervene. Accordingly, the court found that the legislature had
not explicitly or by implication identified a civil cause of action for
95
alleged negligent investigation or intervention. The court stated
that it was relying upon Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriff’s
96
Department, but the court’s reasoning appears to have gone further
than that case. In Bruegger, the court rejected the Brueggers’ claims
because the statute at issue had not expressly or impliedly provided
97
for a cause of action. In Hoppe, the statute at issue did explicitly
provide for a cause of action in some circumstances, but was silent
98
regarding others.
Thus one possible reading of Bruegger and
Hoppe is that Bruegger was governed by the rule that “statutes are
presumed not to alter or modify the common law unless they
99
expressly so provide,” while in Hoppe the court found that by
imposing penalties for some behaviors but not for the specific
wrongs alleged in that case, the legislature did modify the common
law (albeit by omission) and that precluded liability for those
100
specific wrongs.
F.

Summary

After these cases it was unclear when (or whether) the Cracraft
factors were to be applied to tort claims based upon statutory
duties. In Bruegger, the supreme court seemingly ignored Cracraft
and Andrade, discussing the older Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle
case instead. The court did discuss Andrade in Hoppe, but seemed
to limit its application to circumstances where the legislature had
been completely silent regarding liability. Additionally, the court
of appeals and supreme court appeared to part ways on the proper
analysis to be applied when determining whether a statute
94. Id. at 638.
95. Id. The court did not discuss whether the Cracraft factors could still show
that a “special relationship” existed between the county and Hoppe. In this
respect, the court’s decision resembles the reasoning in Valtakis, which the court
of appeals distinguished (and perhaps implicitly criticized) in its own review of
Hoppe’s claim. See Hoppe, 1995 WL 70167, at *5.
96. Hoppe, 543 N.W.2d at 638.
97. Id.
98. Id. (“Here, unlike in Andrade, the legislature has spoken to the question
of penalties of liability to be imposed with regard to the Vulnerable Adults
Reporting Act and has not explicitly or by implication identified a civil cause of
action for alleged negligent investigation or intervention.”).
99. Bruegger v. Faribault County Sheriff’s Dept., 497 N.W.2d 260, 262
(quoting Agassiz v. Magnusson, 272 Minn. 156, 166, 136 N.W.2d 861, 868 (1965)).
100. See Hoppe, 543 N.W.2d at 638.
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implicitly creates a cause of action. The court of appeals adopted a
three-factor test for this issue, while the supreme court’s analysis
remained more nebulous.
The approaches taken by the court of appeals and supreme
court to the question of how statutory duties factor into tort claims
thus reflected something of a jumble of two, and possibly three,
legal doctrines—the common law public duty rule, the implied
statutory cause of action analysis, and the question of whether the
legislature has modified the common law. This was the state of the
law when the Radke case arose.
IV. THE RADKE CASE
A. Statutory Background
The Radke case involved CARA, one of a set of reporting acts
relating specifically to protecting children who may be neglected or
101
abused. The legislature stated that
the public policy of this state is to protect children whose
health or welfare may be jeopardized through physical
abuse, neglect, or sexual abuse . . . . [I]t is the intent of
the legislature . . . to strengthen the family and make the
home, school, and community safe for children by
promoting responsible child care in all settings; and to
provide, when necessary, a safe temporary or permanent
home environment for physically or sexually abused or
102
neglected children.
CARA specifies the persons who are required to report
suspected child abuse, the methods of making reports, the agencies
responsible for assessing or investigating reports of maltreatment,
103
Like
and the duties of those agencies upon receipt of a report.
VARA, CARA imposes obligations to take certain measures in
104
Likewise, CARA lists criminal
response to reports of abuse.
penalties for failure to report, and provides immunity from civil or
101. MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2004). In addition to CARA and VARA, other
reporting acts deal with health professionals’ reports of suspicious wounds and
reports of crimes motivated by bias. See id. §§ 626.52, 626.5531 (mandating health
care professionals’ reports of suspicious wounds and peace officers’ reports of
crimes motivated by bias, respectively).
102. Id. § 626.556, subd. 1.
103. See id. subds. 2, 3-3c, 7, 10.
104. Id. subd. 10.
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criminal liability for persons acting in good faith and assisting in
the assessment, but offers no immunity if the person fails to make a
105
required report or is the abuser. The statute now provides that if
a person makes a report and prevails in a civil action because that
106
person was granted immunity, that person can get attorney fees.
As a result, one could argue that the revised statute seems to
107
contemplate a civil cause of action for a failure to report.
Arguably, if a statutory civil cause of action can be implied for a
failure to report, one can also be implied for a failure to investigate
108
or intervene. However, as is discussed further below, in Radke the
Minnesota Supreme Court did not reach the issue of whether a
statutory cause of action is available and instead focused on the
109
common law arguments.
B. Facts and Procedural History
In January 2003, Matthew Radke brought a common law
negligence action against Freeborn County and two of its social
workers, alleging that their failure to act in good faith and with due
care in following the investigatory procedures of CARA resulted in
110
From
the wrongful death of his and Peggy Radke’s son Makaio.
105. Id. subds. 4-5.
106. Id. subd. 4(d). This provision did not exist when the Minnesota Court of
Appeals, applying the framework in Bruegger, held that no common law duty to
report existed before the statute was enacted, that the only issue was whether the
legislature intended there to be a cause of action, and that the legislature did not
expressly or impliedly create a cause of action for a failure to make a required
report under CARA. Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264, 266-67 (Minn. Ct. App.
1993).
107. The Minnesota Court of Appeals rejected this argument in Kuelbs v.
Williams, 609 N.W.2d 10, 15 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). The supreme court denied
review of that case, in which Kuelbs argued that a police officer made a report of
child abuse in bad faith. Id. at 13. It is conceivable that public policy concerns
may preclude a cause of action in the type of situation involved in Kuelbs, as
opposed when someone fails to make a required report of abuse.
108. In Valtakis, the court stated that the legislature did not intend to create a
civil remedy for a failure to report because it expressly imposed a criminal penalty
and made no mention of a civil remedy. 504 N.W.2d at 266. Because CARA
includes no proscribed criminal penalties for a failure to investigate, it seems that
the reasoning in Valtakis does not necessarily preclude an implied statutory civil
cause of action for a failure to investigate or intervene.
109. The court did not discuss statutory causes of action, but hinted that one
may be implied by CARA’s grant of immunity. Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694
N.W.2d 788, 796 n.3 (Minn. 2005).
110. Radke specifically alleged that the County failed to exercise its duties
under Minnesota Statute section 626.556, subdivisions 10(a) and 10(h)-(j).
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February 2001 through April 2001, when Makaio was about
seventeen to nineteen months old, Peggy Radke’s housemate, Paul
Gutierrez, physically and sexually abused Makaio, eventually killing
111
him.
In February 2001, Makaio became the subject of investigation
by the Freeborn County Human Services Department after a
physician or nurse observed bruises and lesions and made a
112
report. Tammy Ressler, a social worker, visited the home in early
113
March and was told that Makaio had fallen down.
Neither
114
Ressler nor the County investigated the situation further. In late
March, Matthew Radke took Makaio to the police, who
115
photographed Makaio, and to an urgent care center. A physician
at the urgent care center examined Makaio’s multiple bruises,
multiple abrasions, and a burn, and reported the suspected abuse
116
to the Human Services Department.
Four days later, Ressler
visited the home and interviewed Peggy Radke and Gutierrez, who
117
Ressler sent Matthew
provided an explanation for the marks.
Radke a letter stating that the bruise on Makaio’s foot had not been
intentionally inflicted and that child protection services were not
118
necessary.
About two weeks later, in early April, Matthew Radke
and Makaio’s guardian ad litem separately contacted the police
about bruises on Makaio’s face and about their concerns that
119
Makaio was being abused.
Social worker Lisa Frank went to the
120
home about seven to ten days later.
Frank, aware of the prior
abuse allegations, observed fresh bruises on Makaio’s face, rib cage,
and backbone, and saw a foot injury, but took no immediate
Complaint at ¶ 29, Radke v. County of Freeborn, No. C6-02-1692 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
Freeborn County 2003).
111. In State v. Gutierrez, 667 N.W.2d 426, 439 (Minn. 2003), the supreme court
affirmed Gutierrez’s conviction of first-degree murder while committing or
attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree, firstdegree murder while committing child abuse, and second-degree felony murder
while committing or attempting to commit assault in the first degree.
112. Complaint, supra note 110, at 3; Joint and Separate Answer of Defendants
County of Freeborn, Lisa Frank and Tammy Ressler at 2, Radke v. County of
Freeborn, No. C6-02-1692 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Freeborn County 2003).
113. Complaint, supra note 110, at 3.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 3-4.
116. Id. at 4; Answer, supra note 112, at 3.
117. Complaint, supra note 110, at 4; Answer, supra note 112, at 3.
118. Complaint, supra note 110, at 4-5; Answer, supra note 112, at 3.
119. Complaint, supra note 110, at 5.
120. Complaint, supra note 110, at 5-6; Answer, supra note 112, at 3-4.
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121

precautions.
Makaio died that same night when left in
Gutierrez’s care, after suffering numerous bruises, abrasions, and
122
fractures.
Freeborn County, Frank, and Ressler’s Answer denied that the
123
In their
County’s agents were aware of any physical abuse.
Answer, these defendants argued that the report received in late
February was anonymous, and did not contain all of the details of
124
the physician’s observations.
The Answer denied that the
defendants had all the information about the late March medical
125
exam and asserted that Ressler did not observe symptoms of
126
neglect or abuse in her late March 2001 visit to the home. Frank
contended that she had no reason to remove the child from the
home, but that she had determined that further investigation was
127
warranted.
The Answer also stated that the three defendants “acted in
good faith and with due care,” that they “followed the procedures
in Minnesota statutes,” that any negligence on their part was not
the proximate cause of injury to Makaio, and that Gutierrez’s
128
behavior was a superseding and intervening act. The defendants
asserted that
 the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief
129
could be granted;
 the cause of action alleged by Radke “comes from public
duty,” and that the defendants owed the plaintiff no
130
duty; and
 the defendants were entitled to statutory immunity
under
provisions
including
CARA,
statutory
discretionary immunity, official immunity, and other
131
common law and statutory immunities.
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to
132
state a claim for which relief could be granted, and the district
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Complaint, supra note 110, at 5-6; Answer, supra note 112, at 3-4.
Complaint, supra note 110, at 6-7; Answer, supra note 112, at 4.
Answer, supra note 112, at 3-4.
Id. at 2.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 5-6.
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Radke v. County of Freeborn, No. C6-02-
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133

court granted the motion.
Radke appealed, arguing that the defendants had assumed a
duty to act with reasonable care and that this special duty gave rise
134
to the wrongful death negligence claim.
In March 2004, the
Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that CARA does
135
not contain a legislatively-established cause of action.
The court
found that CARA is comparable to VARA and determined that the
Minnesota Supreme Court’s reasoning from Hoppe, in which the
supreme court held that the legislature did not identify a cause of
action under VARA for alleged negligent investigation or
136
Thus, although Radke brought a
intervention, should apply.
common law claim, it appears that by relying on Hoppe the court
affirmed on the basis that no express or implied statutory cause of
action was available.
When affirming, the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that
Radke’s complaint was not specifically based on the defendants’
137
failure to follow CARA.
Without explicitly saying so, the court
seemed to recognize that Radke was attempting to bring a common
law claim, as he did not allege a statutory cause of action when he
argued on appeal that the defendants owed Makaio a special duty.
138
The court admitted the law was not “clear cut” and that it was
sympathetic toward Radke, but nevertheless was “reluctant to
139
supply what the legislature appeared to intentionally omit.”
While the court of appeals discussed Cracraft and Andrade, it
did not rely on those cases or synthesize them with Hoppe; it simply
held there was no legislatively established cause of action for the
140
reasons discussed in Hoppe.
This reliance on Hoppe seems
consistent with the interpretation discussed above—that the
legislature’s deliberate omission of a cause of action modified the
common law in a way that precluded liability for the specific wrongs
1692 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Freeborn County 2003). The defendants moved to dismiss
pursuant to Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure 12.02(b) and 12.03. Id.
133. Order of June 2, 2003, Radke v. County of Freeborn, No. C6-02-1692
(Minn. Dist. Ct. Freeborn County 2003) (dismissing the case with prejudice on the
merits).
134. Radke v. County of Freeborn, 676 N.W.2d 295, 298 (Minn. Ct. App.
2004).
135. Id. at 301.
136. Id. at 300.
137. Id. at 298.
138. Id. at 300.
139. Id. at 298-300.
140. Id.
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alleged in this case. This reading is also consistent with the
141
Minnesota Court of Appeals’ brief mention of the Valtakis case,
where the same court held that no statutory civil cause of action
was available for failure to make a required report of child abuse
because the legislature failed to provide a civil remedy when it
142
outlined criminal penalties for that behavior.
Radke appealed to the Minnesota Supreme Court, raising the
legal issue of whether a cause of action existed for the wrongful
death of a child caused by the negligence of a county and two social
143
workers who assumed a special duty to the child.
C. The Arguments Raised by the Parties
In their briefs to the Minnesota Supreme Court, appellant
Radke primarily relied on Cracraft and Andrade, while respondents
Freeborn County and the social workers generally argued that
144
Neither party focused on the distinction
Hoppe controlled.
between statutory and common law causes of action, or the
circumstances under which a statute would be regarded as having
modified the common law (which, as we have seen, seemed to
factor into the supreme court’s Hoppe decision).
Radke argued that the court of appeals misapplied the third
Cracraft factor and failed to apply the other factors when it found
that there was no language in CARA that explicitly or impliedly
145
permitted a civil cause of action.
He then contended that the
third Cracraft factor alone was sufficient to allow a cause of action
because Makaio was within the class of persons that the statute was
146
designed to protect, and the other factors were “helpful.”
In his
brief, Radke asserted that the county had actual knowledge of the
abuse, that there were insufficient facts in the record to determine
whether Radke had reasonably relied on the actions of the county,
and that the county increased the harm to Makaio by failing to
147
remove him from the home, particularly on the day of his death.
Radke argued that Hoppe was distinguishable because that case
141. Id. at 298.
142. Valtakis v. Putnam, 504 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
143. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at v, Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694
N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 2005) (No. A03-797).
144. Id. at 9-16, 20-31; Brief of Respondent-Appellee at 8-13, 16-22, Radke v.
County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788 (Minn. 2005) (No. A03-797).
145. Brief of Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 143, at 10.
146. Id. at 11-14.
147. Id. at 21-28.
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involved the county’s failure to initiate an investigation, while this
case involved the county’s negligence while conducting an
148
investigation.
Because this case involved a negligent
investigation, Radke asserted, the county had assumed a duty of
149
care and breached that duty. Finally, Radke distinguished CARA
from VARA and argued that Hoppe did not apply to this case
because there were greater public policy concerns due to children
150
being more vulnerable than adults.
The county argued that CARA is almost identical to VARA, and
contended that, as a result, Hoppe dictated that no cause of action
151
was available under CARA.
The county further argued that
because no cause of action is available under CARA, no other
theory of liability—such as a special duty under Cracraft or Andrade,
152
or an assumed duty—was available. Thus, in essence, the county
argued that the absence of a statutory cause of action precluded any
common law claim.
D. The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision
In its decision, the Minnesota Supreme Court first discussed
the principle from Andrade that a person generally only has a
common law duty to prevent a third person from harming another
if there is some sort of special relationship, noted that it applied
this principle to government torts in Cracraft when it stated that a
governmental unit can only be found liable if the governmental
unit owed “the plaintiff a duty different than that owed to the
general public,” and then reiterated that Cracraft set out the test for
153
determining whether a special duty exists.
The court explained
that the existence of a statute such as CARA cannot alone create a
special duty because there must be additional indicia that the
governmental unit undertook the responsibility of protecting a
particular class of persons “from the risks associated with a
154
particular harm.”
It then described the four Cracraft factors,
reiterating that they are not exhaustive and that there is no bright

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
1979)).

Id. at 19.
Id. at 29-32.
Id. at 32-36.
Brief of Respondent-Appellee, supra note 144, at 7-8.
Id. at 11-14.
Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. 2005).
Id. (citing Cracraft v. City of St. Louis Park, 279 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Minn.
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line rule, but explained that it found in Andrade that the third
factor was “so overwhelmingly dominant” that it had no difficulty
finding a special relation, even though two of the four Cracraft
155
factors had not been met.
The court then discussed its decision in Hoppe in terms that are
remarkably circumspect for a case about to be overruled. The
court stated that it had found in Hoppe that VARA could not “form
156
the basis for a civil cause of action in negligence,” a description
which appears to be a tacit admission that Hoppe involved a
common law cause of action rather than a statutory one. Similarly,
the Radke court noted that Hoppe had distinguished Andrade
without directly analyzing the Cracraft factors when it held that no
cause of action was available to the guardian of a vulnerable adult
because the legislature did not expressly or impliedly create a cause
157
of action when enacting VARA.
Curiously, however, the court
did not directly confront the propriety of Hoppe’s reliance on the
implied statutory cause of action analysis in place of the common
law public duty analysis.
Instead, the court explained that although Radke could be
distinguished from Hoppe on the basis that VARA and CARA are
only similar and not identical, its true reason for distinguishing the
two was based on public policy concerns—specifically, that the
concerns raised in Radke were similar to those raised in Andrade:
158
providing a safe environment for children in a private home.
The court reiterated that whether a common law cause of action is
available due to a statute’s creation of a special duty involves a case159
by-case analysis of the Cracraft factors.
The court began with the third Cracraft factor and found that
CARA sets forth mandatory reporting and investigatory acts that are
for the protection of a particular class of persons—children who
are identified as suspected victims of abuse or neglect—rather than
the public in general and, as a result, held that the third Cracraft
160
factor was satisfied.
The court then analyzed the other Cracraft
factors, finding that Freeborn County had actual knowledge of the
abuse; that while it could not conclusively find that Radke
155.
1986)).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 794 (citing Andrade v. Ellefson, 391 N.W.2d 836, 843 (Minn.
Id. at 795.
Id.
Id. at 795-96.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 797.
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reasonably relied on the county’s representations, it was difficult to
speculate what more Radke could have done about the situation;
and that Radke did not establish that the county increased the risk
161
of harm to Makaio.
Despite the fact that not all factors were
satisfied, the supreme court found that, like in Andrade, the third
factor was overwhelmingly dominant and that the county owed
162
Makaio a special duty. It thus held that “a cause of action can be
maintained for negligence in the investigation of child abuse and
neglect reports as required under CARA,” and reversed and
163
remanded the case to the district court.
V. CONCLUSION: LINGERING QUESTIONS
By all appearances, Radke fully restores Cracraft and the public
duty rule as a legal doctrine that stands separate and distinct from
the analysis used to discover implicit statutory causes of action. But
for some reason, the court appears to have been reluctant to come
right out and say as much. Even when ultimately overruling Hoppe,
the court was circumspect, stating that it found it impossible to
harmonize Hoppe with Cracraft and Andrade and that it was
overruling Hoppe to avoid eviscerating “the legal principles
164
regarding special duties set forth in Cracraft and Andrade.”
Because the Radke court determined that the Hoppe and Radke
cases each dealt with common law claims regarding governmental
actors’ duties under reporting statutes but had different outcomes,
one can understand why the court felt it had to overrule Hoppe to
achieve uniformity. Absent a more detailed explanation by the
supreme court, however, it remains unclear in what ways the court
believes the analysis in Hoppe was flawed or how to synthesize
Bruegger with Cracraft and its progeny.
In this and other respects, Radke represents something of a
missed opportunity to truly clarify this area of the law. As already
noted, the court did suggest that it was restoring the principle that
a common law negligence claim can be brought based on duties
165
prescribed by statute.
But, it is still unclear what specific factors
the supreme court will apply to determine whether a statute implies
161. Id. at 797-98.
162. Id. at 798.
163. Id. at 799. The court noted that the issue of immunity was not before it.
Id. at 799 n.6.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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a cause of action separate and apart from any common law cause of
action. And perhaps most seriously, the court did not squarely
address the notion lurking behind Bruegger and Hoppe—that the
legislature’s withholding of an express cause of action may be
interpreted as an affirmative act intended to alter the underlying
common law to preclude private common law causes of action.
Future case law applying Radke and these other cases may bring
additional clarity to these issues.

